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Abstract
The paper introduces an additional channel via which corruption may adversely
a¤ect environmental quality. It is argued that, in the presence of corruption,
politicians may allocate a large fraction of public funds to environmental projects
aiming not at improving environmental quality, but rather at increasing their ability
to extract rents. This type of behavior has a direct and an indirect e¤ect on
environmental quality. First, due to extensive rent-seeking, the e¤ectiveness of
environmental projects is disproportional to the amount of public funds allocated
to them. Second, citizens who observe the poor outcome of environmental projects,
increase tax evasion thus reducing public funds. A vicious circle of extensive tax
evasion and rent seeking activities emerges, that has a detrimental e¤ect on envi-
ronmental quality. Anecdotal evidence from a number of countries that experience
We would like to thank Theodore Palivos for insightful comments.
yCorresponding author: Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance, University of Luxembourg, 148,
avenue de la Faiencerie, L - 1511 Luxembourg. E-mail: anastasia.litina@uni.lu
1
high levels of corruption, shows little or no improvements in environmental quality
despite the implementation of environmental projects. In line with our theoretical
ndings, this ine¤ectiveness of the environmental policy is present even when the
technology involved is advanced.
JEL Classication: Q5, D73
Keywords: Corruption, Environment, Technology
1 Introduction
Corruption in its various forms and expressions is a long-lasting phenomenon prevalent,
albeit in a varying degree of intensity, in both developed and developing countries. Its
detrimental e¤ects on a wide range of social and economic aspects have been extensively
analyzed, including the e¤ect of corruption on economic growth, education and the
e¤ectiveness of foreign aid. It is only recently that the e¤ect of corruption on the
design and e¤ectiveness of environmental policy has been explored, focusing mainly on
the role of lobbying groups in a¤ecting the stringency of environmental policies and thus,
environmental quality.
The present paper explores a di¤erent channel via which corruption can a¤ect
environmental quality. In particular, we argue that in countries experiencing high level
of corruption, politicians may allocate a large fraction of public funds to technologically
advanced environmental projects aiming however, at increasing their ability to extract
high rents rather than improving environmental quality. The behavior of these selshly
motivated politicians has two consequences: i) decreases the policys e¤ectiveness due to
extensive rent-seeking, and ii) reduces tax revenues as citizens, who observe the policys
poor outcome, increase their tax evasion. Thus, the presence of widespread embezzlement
leads to a vicious circle of extensive tax evasion and rent seeking, with detrimental e¤ects
on environmental quality. Anecdotal evidence from a number of countries with high level
of corruption shows that large investments in technologically advanced environmental
projects do not yield improvements in environmental quality, thus lending credence to
our theoretical hypothesis.
There are two important assumptions embedded in our model that allow us to
explore the e¤ect of corruption on environmental quality. First, we emphasize the impor-
tance of the interaction between politicians and citizens. We assume that both groups
choices are driven by two, conicting, types of incentives: rst, an altruistic incentive,
that is to transfer good quality public goods to their o¤springs and second, a selsh
incentive, which is to maximize their own consumption by engaging in corrupt activities.
In particular, taxpayers have the option to evade taxes, while politicians have the option
to embezzle part of the tax revenue.1 We show that the two groupscommon interest in
1In this framework we will adopt the term corruption both for rent-seeking activities and for tax
evasion. Whereas there is a broad consensus as to the fact that embezzlement of public funds is a corrupt
activity, this is not the case for tax evasion. There is an ongoing debate as to whether tax evasion can
be classied as corruption according to the term employed by the World Bank (the abuse of public o¢ ce
for private gain). For the shake of brevity we will abstract from this debate and we will adopt the term
corruption interchangeably for both activities.
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their o¤springswellbeing results in the interaction between their decisions to engage in
corrupt activities.
Second, following the literature, we assume that politiciansability to extract rents
is directly related to the level of technology employed in each type of public spending.
The intuition is that more advanced technology involves less transparent expenditure
allowing the extraction of higher rents. Empirical evidence also conrms this argument,
showing that public spending on more technologically advanced sectors, such as the
military and the energy sector, su¤er from more widespread corruption relatively to
more labour intensive sectors such as education.2 In order to simplify the analysis, we
assume that politicians allocate the total tax revenue between environmental improving
projects (hereafter also called abatement activities) and education. Abatement activities,
which can include investment on renewables and carbon capture and storage projects, is
the technology intensive activity involving less transparent expenditure, while education,
associated mainly with teacherswages, is the more transparent activity.3 To further
simplify the analysis we assume that the rates of rent seeking associated with each of the
two activities are xed and exogenously given.
The above framework allow us to focus on the strategic interactions between
citizens who pay taxes and politicians who allocate public funds between the two types
of activities. Whenever taxpayers observe politicians directing disproportionately higher
level of public funds to the high rent seeking activity, they react by increasing the rate
of their tax evasion. On the contrary, whenever they observe politicians directing more
resources to the less rent seeking activity, they respond by increasing their compliance.
Crucially, the type of interaction between the two groups (i.e., strategic complementarity
or strategic substitutability) as well as the emerging equilibria depend primarily on the
level of technology used in each sector and the associated rent seeking rates. Therefore,
environmental quality at the equilibrium critically depends on the interaction between
abatement technology and rent seeking opportunities.
In order to derive analytical results, we develop a highly stylized model. However,
a more elaborate model relaxing the main assumptions, yields qualitatively similar results.
The augmented version of the model is not fully tractable analytically and thus, we resort
to numerical simulations. For presentation purposes, we relegate the presentation of this
model to an appendix.
2See for example Gupta et al.(2000), Delavallade (2006) and Mauro (1998).
3See Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) and (2000) and Hessami (2010).
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Our results have two important policy implications with respect to the e¤ectiveness
of environmental public projects. First, the e¤ectiveness of publicly funded environmental
projects does not depend only on the level of spending, but also on the level of corruption.
The reason is that in the presence of rent-seeking by politicians that leads to improper
implementation of environmental projects, citizens increase tax evasion. As a result,
the total amount of public funds are reduced with detrimental e¤ects on environmental
quality. Second, the promotion of technologically advanced environmental projects does
not guarantee improvements in environmental quality in the presence of corruption. This
is so, because advanced technologies are associated with higher embezzlement of public
funds. Therefore, strengthening the institutional system by improving transparency and
reducing corruption is crucial for increasing tax revenues and allocating them e¢ ciently
among di¤erent activities.
The present paper relates to two strands in the literature. The rst, explores the
e¤ect of corruption on environmental quality. The majority of contributions uses a polit-
ical economy approach and explores the e¤ect of bureaucracy and lobbying groups on the
stringency of environmental policy. Pashigian (1985) explains how locational competition
among regions with di¤erent growth rates a¤ects the stringency of regulations in these
regions. Cropper et al. (1992) and Helland (1998) report the e¤ect of environmental
interests on political and budget considerations on the US Environmental Protection
Agency (US EPA) regulations. Lopez and Mitra (2000) examine the e¤ect of corruption
and rent seeking on the relationship between pollution and growth and on the shape of the
environmental Kuznets curve, while Fredriksson and Millimet (2000) and Fredriksson et
al. (2003) examine the e¤ect of corruption and rent seeking on US FDI, on the stringency
of environmental policy and the pollution haven hypothesis. Fredriksson et al. (2010)
argue that in the presence of majoritarian systems the majority party may impose sub-
optimally high or low pollution taxes due to a majority bias. Fredriksson and Wollscheid
(2014) argue that the e¤ects of party discipline and party strength on environmental policy
are conditional on the degree of political stability. In our paper, we focus on a di¤erent
channel through which the e¤ect of corruption on environmental quality may take place,
i.e., via rent-seeking opportunities associated with investment in environmental projects.
Second, we build upon the literature exploring the interactions among di¤erent
societal groups, including the government. We argue that politicianscorrupt behavior
may trigger non-compliance on behalf of citizens, leading to the reduction of total public
revenues. This suggests that corruption seems to be contagious, or as Andvig and Moene
(1990) put it "corruption may corrupt". Tanzi and Davoodi (2000) investigate the
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relationship between levels of corruption (measured by corruption perception indices)
and GDP in a sample of 97 countries and nd that higher corruption is consistent with
lower revenues of all types of taxes, especially income taxes. Whenever taxpayers feel that
politicians are corrupt or that their burden is not fair compared to others they choose to
become more corrupt as well. Litina and Palivos (2013) associate the current economic
crisis in Greece with corrupt activities of di¤erent societal groups and their interaction.
Section 2 of the paper provides some anecdotal evidence that motivates our analy-
sis. Section 3 introduces the benchmark model. We resort to a simple framework that
allows us to obtain analytical results and to account for the fact that more funds on
abatement may lead to lower environmental quality. Section 4 concludes the paper. The
appendix establishes the robustness of our theoretical results via employing a set of more
realistic assumptions. As these assumptions increase the complexity of the model we solve
it numerically and show that it can yield qualitatively similar predictions.
2 Anecdotal Evidence
One of the major problems associated with tracing corrupt activities is driven by the
fact that they take place secretly and come to the surface only if/when revealed and
investigated. This is particularly true for the case of environmental policy and illegal
activities associated with it. Two main reasons can account for this fact. First, it is only
in the last few decades, that large environmental projects have been undertaken and thus
corruption activities associated with them are also a relatively new phenomenon. Second,
the technology associated with these projects is rather advanced and therefore it is even
more di¢ cult to identify the instances of corruption since they involve less transparent
activities.
Two examples are cited in this section: i) The Lesotho Highlands Water Project
(LHWP); and ii) The SISTRI Project. Moreover in Section 2.3 we present some simple
correlations indicating the negative e¤ect of corruption on environmental quality and
suggesting an interaction between the stage of technology and the level of corruption.
2.1 Lesotho Highlands Water Project
The Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) was initiated in 1986 by an agreement
between the governments of Lesotho and South Africa, and it was, at the time, the most
extensive international water transfer project globally. Its aim was to provide water
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resources to Johannesburg by diverting it from the Orange to the Vaal river. Moreover it
was supposed to generate royalties from water sales and hydroelectric power for Lesotho.
The agreement dedicated resources to the development of the rural areas of Lesotho, the
compensation for those who have been displaced and amendments to the areas a¤ected
by the project.
The implementation of the project required the development of a number of dams
and tunnels and the estimated cost of the project was more than $8 billion. As the project
expanded across a large area, the benets associated with it came with substantial envi-
ronmental costs to nearby communities. A signicant part of the projects cost was related
to the development of a social fund aimed at mitigating the environmental consequences.
During the rst phase of the project 4 dams and 110km of tunnels were constructed.
Nevertheless, the project remains largely unnished, the expected benets have not been
realized, while extensive environmental degradation has occurred. The delay is due to
a number of corruption scandals related to the project. In 1999 a corruption scandal
burst out, involving 12 companies and the Chief executive of the Lesotho Highlands
Development Agency. In particular, the companies were accused of o¤ering huge bribes
to win various contracts. These actions resulted in the ine¢ cient management of the
projects funds, inating the nancial cost and increasing the environmental burden. After
the Agencys Chief executive himself was found guilty, three major European rms were
also found guilty and charged, and one Canadian rm has been debarred at the World
Bank. This situation defamed the project, delaying its second phase which was initiated
only very recently (March 2014) amidst concerns about the likelihood of corruption in
tender processes.
2.2 The SISTRI Project
In 2009 the Italian Ministry of Environment launched an information system, SISTRI,
aimed at unifying the waste management services at the national level and improving the
urban waste management at the Campania region. The implementation of the system
was expected to yield substantial environmental improvements through the deterrence of
illegal waste dumping and signicant cost reductions. The estimated cost of the project
was about 400 million euros and it involved highly sophisticated technology that would
ensure the achievement of the ambitious goals. Nevertheless, a large part of the funds were
collected by the companies via non-transparent procedures without any advancement of
the project. A large scandal emerged involving bribes, embezzlement of the funds and a
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number of other illegal activities. The projects launch date was postponed twice before
being abolished in August 2011. A number of people have been persecuted, among them
government o¢ cials and a member of the parliament. More recently (March 2014), two
former managers of Finmeccanica SpA, Italys state-controlled defense and industrial
group, have also been arrested over allegations of international corruption in relation to
the SISTRI project.
2.3 Empirical Evidence
To further motivate the analysis and support the hypothesis advanced in this paper, we
show correlations between proxies of environmental policies, corruption and environmental
quality. The analysis of this section is only illustrative and is not aspiring to provide an
empirical argument. Nevertheless is it quite useful in quantifying the papers arguments
and illustrating the interaction between corruption and environmental quality. Overall,
the theoretical hypothesis advanced in the paper is that the e¤ectiveness of environmental
policy depends on the extend of corruption which is positively associated with the level
of technology used. We employ a sample of 132 countries, drawing data from the World
Bank for the period 1996-2010 for which the data is available.
Table 1 presents the results of our regression analysis. In column (1), we use a
per capita measure of CO2 emissions measured in metric tons as proxy for environmental
quality. As a proxy of environmental policy we use a measure of electricity production
from renewable resources as a fraction of the total electricity production (both measured
in kWh). In the absence of data on the actual cost of implementing this policy, we
make the implicit assumption that this measure proxies both the costs associated with
these technologies and the level of the technology employed. As a proxy for the level of
corruption in a country we employ the corruption perception index from the Transparency
International (CPI index-TI). The measure we use ranges from zero to ten, with ten
denoting the most corrupt country.4
Interestingly, the correlation coe¢ cients support the theoretical hypothesis ad-
vanced in this paper. Note rst that the negative coe¢ cient of investment in renewables
conrms that higher investment in renewables is associated with lower per capita emis-
sions. Most importantly though, the coe¢ cient of corruption is positive, thereby capturing
the adverse e¤ect of corruption on environmental quality. The positive and statistically
4It should be noted that we have rescaled the standard CPI measure, to make the interpretation of
our results more tractable. Therefore, higher values of our index, indicate more corrupt countries.
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signicant coe¢ cient of the interactive term captures the partial e¤ect of investment in
renewables holding the level of corruption constant, i.e. investment in renewables is less
e¢ cient in more corrupt economies.
In column (2) we use an alternative proxy for environmental policy, namely produc-
tion of electricity from natural gas resources as a percentage of total electricity. Increasing
the share of natural gas decreases CO2 emissions, with the coe¢ cient being smaller than
in the case of renewables. The coe¢ cient of corruption is statistically insignicant and
the interaction term is positive. Although the promotion of natural gas presents an envi-
ronmental improvement over coal and oil, it is not as e¤ective as renewables in reducing
CO2 emissions. Furthermore, natural gas is relatively less advanced technologically than
renewables and thus, less prone to corruption. The theoretical framework of the paper
captures precisely this interaction between environmental technology and the extend of
corruption in an economy.
Finally column (3) replicates the analysis in column (1) using an alternative
measure of corruption from the World Governance Indicators (WGI). This measure ranges
from -2.5 to 2.5 with 2.5 referring to the most corrupt country.5 The results are similar
to those in column (1), with the positive coe¢ cient of corruption suggesting that indeed
corruption confers a negative e¤ect on environmental quality. The interactive term is also
positive. All three columns introduce time and country xed e¤ects therefore netting out
many sources of unobserved heterogeneity.
We view these results as simple correlations that nevertheless clarify the argument
advanced in the paper. A rened empirical work is beyond the scope of our analysis.
Overall the aim of this section is to provide evidence that corruption has an adverse e¤ect
on environmental quality and to relate the level of corruption to the level of the employed
technology.
5Similarly to the CPI measure, in the context of our analysis the measure of corruption has been
rescaled.
7
(1) (2) (3)
Per Cap. CO2 Emissions
Renewable Resources (RR) -0.123*** -0.154***
(0.023) (0.036)
Natural Gas Resources (NR) -0.045***
(0.006)
Corruption Perception Index-Rescaled (CPI) 0.112* -0.091
(0.061) (0.066)
Control of Corruption-Rescaled (CC) 0.538***
(0.169)
Interaction 0.016*** 0.009*** 0.035**
(0.005) (0.001) (0.015)
Time Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1670 1670 1460
Countries 132 132 134
Years 15 15 11
R-squared 0.039 0.060 0.048
Summary: This table illustrates that the reduction of CO2 emissions via
the use of alternative sources of electricity production is less e¤ective in the
presence of corruption, while controlling for country and time xed e¤ects.
Notes: (i) Per capita CO2 Emissions measure is the per capita level of CO2 emissions
measured in metric tons; (ii) Nuclear Electricity Production is a measure of electricity
production from nuclear sources as a fraction of the total electricity production (both
measured in kWh); (iii) CPI is a measure of corruption provided by Transparency
International (TI). Countries are scaled from 0-10 with 10 being the least corrupt. In this
table the measure of corruption has been rescaled with 10 indicating the most corrupt
country; (iv) Control of Corruption is a measure on the control of corruption from the
World Governance Indicators (WGI). This measure ranges from -2.5 to 2.5 with the
latter referring to the least corrupt country. Similarly, this measure has been rescaled
with 2.5 indicating the most corrupt country; (v) Robust standard error estimates are
reported in parentheses; (vi) *** denotes statistical signicance at the 1 percent level,
** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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3 The Benchmark Model
Consider a perfectly competitive overlapping generations economy where economic activ-
ity extends over innite discrete time and a single good is being produced in the private
sector. Individuals live for two periods i.e. childhood and adulthood. During the rst
period of their life individuals acquire human capital via public schooling, whereas during
adulthood they either enter the private market or they become politicians via a random
selection process. Their preferences are dened over their own consumption, as well as
over the well being of their o¤spring, which is captured by the level of human capital and
the quality of the environment they bequeath to them.6
3.1 The Structure of the Economy
In each period t; a generation of individuals of measure one is born. Each individual has
a single parent. During childhood individuals acquire human capital and for simplicity,
it is assumed that they are not economically active; their consumption is incorporated
into their parentsconsumption. During adulthood individuals are economically active
allocating their income between current consumption and their o¤springswell being.
Formally, individuals born at t   1, during their adulthood (i.e., in period t), maximize
the following utility function,
ut = ct (ht+1 +Qt+1) ; (1)
where ct denotes the adults level of consumption, ht+1 their o¤springs human capital
and Qt+1 the environmental quality handed over to their o¤springs. The presence of the
o¤springs human capital level and environmental quality in the parental utility function
captures the adult agents vested interest in publicly funded education and environmental
projects (abatement activities).7
6Environmental quality a¤ects o¤springswell-being either directly, e.g., they simply gain utility from
a clean environment, as we assume in this version of the model, or both directly and indirectly via a¤ecting
production as well. The latter case where environmental quality can be an input in the production process
is explored in the more elaborate version of the model (see the appendix). In both cases it is not a crucial
assumption that can alter our qualitative results.
7The introduction of a parameter measuring the relative strength of the altruistic motive associated
with each activity, i.e., education and environmental quality, would further complicate our analysis
without providing additional insights.
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Following the related literature we assume that the learning technology is described
by,8
ht = H0Ht 1   vHt 1 +BEt 1 ; (2)
where t denotes time, ht the level of human capital acquired by an individual born at
t   1, Ht 1 the average stock of human capital present in the economy at time t   1;
and Et 1 the public spending on education in the same period. According to this human
capital accumulation process, a young agent born in period t  1, can pick up a fraction
H0 2 [0; 1] of the existing (average) level of human capital Ht 1 without any cost, simply
by observing what the previous generation does. Existing human capital depreciates at
a rate v: The further enhancement of an agents human capital is possible only with the
allocation of public resources to education, Et 1. The parameter B > 0 measures the
e¢ ciency of the public education system. Therefore, the overall level of human capital
reects the e¤ect of both societal knowledge and formal education.
The evolution of environmental quality is described by,
Qt = Q0Ht 1    Ht 1 + At 1; Q0 >  ; (3)
where Q0Ht 1 denotes the initial state of environmental quality Q0, conditional on the
level of production Ht 1 in period t   1. The term  Ht 1 captures the environmental
damage caused by production in the previous period (we assume that production employs
only human capital), and  is a technological parameter that can be interpreted as the
rate of environmental degradation per unit of output. The term At 1 captures the
benecial e¤ect of publicly funded abatement activities on environmental quality, where
A is a technological parameter.9
3.2 Citizens and Politicians
Individuals entering into adulthood, via a random process, are either employed in the
private sector (hereafter called citizens) or they become politicians. Individual preferences
are independent of occupation. For analytical convenience it is assumed that there is a
continuum of agents within each group that is normalized to unity. In terms of notation,
8See for example De Gregorio and Kim (2000) and Ceroni (2001).
9For analytical convenience we assume that: i) both dynamic equations for the evolution of public
goods are symmetric, and ii) environmental quality depends on the level of economic activity. These
simplifying assumptions are quite useful in obtaining analytical solutions. However in the appendix
we employ a more elaborate version of the model, that adopts more realistic assumptions and yields
qualitatively similar results.
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the subscripts c and p are used to denote variables that are related to citizens and
politicians respectively.
Citizens produce a single good consumed by both groups. In the baseline version
of the model we assume that production employs only human capital, while the envi-
ronment does not contribute to the production process.10 Thus, using the appropriate
normalization of units, each citizens output yt is,11
yt = ht: (4)
It follows that the aggregate production function is linear to the aggregate level of human
capital, that is, Yt = Ht. Notice that since the size of each group is normalized to one,
ht = Ht and thus, yt = Yt.
The revenue for the provision of public education and abatement comes from
taxing citizens income. In particular, citizens are being taxed at the rate  ; which is
assumed to be exogenous and time invariant. Citizens have the option to evade a fraction
of their taxes and thus they can decide upon the fraction zt of their income that is
declared to the tax authority. For the shake of brevity it is assumed that the citizens
declaration is never audited; consequently, tax evasion does not involve any risk. Although
tax payments are implicitly assumed to be a voluntary contribution, citizensfree riding
incentive is mitigated by their altruistic concerns about their o¤springseducation and
environmental quality and thus they always declare a positive fraction of their income, as
will be illustrated in a following section.12
Politicians do not participate in the production process. Instead their role lies
in determining the allocation of public funds between education (a fraction  of the
total tax revenue) and abatement activities. The politician receives a xed income, as
a reimbursement for her service, which for analytical convenience and without loss of
generality is assumed to be equal to zero. Moreover, she has the option to embezzle part
of the total tax revenue as a means of supplementing her income.13 More specically, she
10The robustness to this assumption is tested in the more elaborate version of the model in the appendix,
where we assume that environmental quality is also an input to the production process.
11Since all agents have the same level of human capital we omit the subscript i = c; p.
12This also implies that adding the possibility of auditing and the subsequent nes would not
qualitatively a¤ect the main results, it would only a¤ect the scale of the e¤ect.
13Assuming a positive reimbursement for the politician (either a constant amount, or a fraction of the
tax revenue) reduces the magnitude of the incentive to embezzle public funds, but it does not qualitatively
a¤ect the results. As long as there is an incentive to embezzle part of the funds, the results of the model
remain robust to this assumption. In order to focus on the decision of allocating public funds between
the two policies, we choose not to model the decision of whether to embezzle or not.
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can embezzle a fraction (1   !q) of public funds directed to abatement, and a fraction
(1   !h) of the funds earmarked for education. It is assumed that both !q and !h are
exogenously given, strictly positive and less than one. The magnitude of the !s depends
on the economys institutional, political and social characteristics, whereas their relative
magnitude, i.e. whether !q ? !h, depends on the public activitys characteristics.
For instance one could argue that !h > !q, since education involves mainly
transparent transactions, such as wages and equipment that are not overly technologically
advanced and thus, it is associated with low rates of rent seeking.14 On the other hand,
abatement technology can be rather sophisticated and thus less transparent. As suggested
by Tanzi and Davoodi (1997), the more technology-intensive is an activity, the less suscep-
tible it is to citizensscrutiny, and thus the higher the level of rent seeking associated with
it. However, rent seeking rates related to environmental projects can vary signicantly
depending on the type of abatement technology. For example, reforestation involves
much less sophisticated technology and is thus a much more transparent activity than
investment in renewables. In order to be able to discuss the choice between environmental
policy and any other type of public policy, we allow the relative magnitude of !s to vary.
We assume that the politician is aware of the values of !q and !h before allocating the
available public funds between the two activities.
We further assume that the politician is never investigated and hence peculation
does not involve any risk. Given that the politician has zero income, she will always have
an incentive to embezzle a fraction of the tax revenue. However, the politicians concern
over her o¤springs well-being ensures that she will always have an incentive to allocate
the public funds in both activities and will not direct them only to the more rent-seeking
one.15
Since only citizens are being taxed, the total tax revenue Rt, collected in period
t, is the fraction of the aggregate income that is being declared and therefore taxed, i.e.
Rt = ztht. In the absence of embezzlement by the politician, a fraction tztht of the tax
revenue would be earmarked for education and the remaining (1 t)ztht for abatement.
However, the politician peculates a fraction of this revenue. In particular, she
peculates a fraction 1 !h (1 !q) of the tax revenue earmarked for education (abatement),
14The literature shows that the rate of rent-seeking in education is low but can vary across countries
(Reinikka and Svensson, 2005) depending on the overall level of corruption and the associated expenses.
15Similarly to the case of the citizen, as long as the politician has an incentive to direct part of the
funds in both activities, enriching the model with a probability to be caught and punished would increase
the complexity of the model without adding further insights.
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and thus, the actual amount spent on education Et (abatement t) is,
Et = 't!hztht; (5)
t = (1  't)!qztht ; (6)
respectively. Overall, individualsdecisions at time t regarding the level of tax evasion
and the allocation of public funds, have an indirect e¤ect on the aggregate level of both
public goods, i.e. education and abatement, which is enjoyed by the o¤springs of both
types of individuals. Therefore, citizensdecisions are indirectly a¤ected by the decisions
of the politicians and vice versa, driven by the altruistic incentives of both groups, thus
suggesting the presence of strategic interactions in their decision making process.
3.3 Optimization
Citizen
As discussed above, citizens preferences are dened over his own consumption in
period t, cct, and his o¤springs well being in the next period t + 1 as a¤ected by the
level of human capital they will acquire ht+1, and the quality of the environment Qt+1.
His gross income in period t is ht, which is taxed at the exogenous rate  . The citizen
chooses the fraction zt of his income to declare to the tax authorities and pays income tax
ztht, which implicitly determines consumption at time t and the level of public goods
transferred to his o¤spring.16 We assume that citizens have full information regarding the
politiciansability to embezzle part of the total tax revenue. That is, they know the values
of !q and !h and they observe the politiciansdecision of allocating public funds between
the two activities.17 Therefore, each citizen solves the following optimization problem,
max
cct;zt
cct (Ht+1;+Qt+1) ; (7)
subject to cct = (1  zt)ht ;
cct  0; 1  zt  0 ;
where h, Q, E and  are determined by equations (2), (3), (5) and (6), taking 't, Q0 and
Ht as given.
16Consumption at time t equals the citizens disposable income (1  )ztht + (1  zt)ht = (1  zt)ht.
17Introducing partial information would unnecessarily complicate the analysis.
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Maximization yields the citizens choice of zt as function of the models parameters
and the politicians choice of '. Thus, we get the citizens best response function to the
politicians choice of ',
zt = f('t) =
(A!q   't
T ) 	
2(A!q   't
T )
; (8)
where 
T = A!q  B!h and 	 = Q0+H0    v. The second order condition, ensuring
concavity, requires that A!q   't
T > 0, which always holds since 't  1.
Furthermore, an interior solution (1 > z > 0) exists i¤ (1   2)(A!q   't
T ) <
	 < A!q   't
T . On the contrary, a corner solution will emerge if 	  (A!q   't
T )
(zt = 0) or 	  (1  2)(A!q   't
T ) (zt = 1).
Comparative statics suggest that when v and  increase, i.e., when there is ex-
tensive depreciation of environmental quality and human capital, the incentive to evade
decreases and thus individuals choose to evade a small fraction of their income. On the
contrary when Q0 and H0 increase, then zt decreases suggesting that there is a reduced
incentive to be honest and thus individuals may evade more. Lemma 1 presents the
comparative statics with respect to technology and policy parameters.
Lemma 1 Whenever an interior solution emerges, the tax evasion rate ( 1   zt)
is reduced:
i) the more e¢ cient is the use of tax revenues, (i.e. the higher are A and B),
ii) the lower are the rent seeking rates (i.e., !q and !h), and
iii) the lower is the tax rate,  .
Proof. Results (i)-(iii) can be obtained by taking the derivatives of the interior
solution with respect to each parameter.
Politician
Since we have assumed that individual preferences are independent of occupation,
politicians preferences are also given by (1). Assuming zero income from other sources, the
politician derives income only via the embezzlement of public funds. Taking as given the
rent-seeking rate associated with education 1 !h; and abatement 1 !q, she determines
the allocation of public revenues between the two activities in order to maximize her utility.
Her income equals the sum of the funds embezzled from the education and abatement
activities, i.e. (1 't)(1 !q)ztHt+t(1 !h)ztHt. The politician solves the following
optimization problem with respect to the fraction of revenue that will be allocated in each
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activity t,
max
cpt;'t
cpt (Ht+1;+Qt+1) ; (9)
subject to cpt = [(1  't)(1  !q) + t(1  !h)]ztht;
cpt  0; 1  't  0;
where h, Q, E and  are determined by equations (2), (3), (5) and (6), taking zt, Q0; Ho
and Ht as given.
The rst order condition of (9) yields the politicians best response function to
citizens choice of zt,
't = g(zt) =
	
  zt [(1  !q)
T   A!q
]
2zt
T

=
	
2zt
T
  (1  !q)
T   A!q

2
T

; (10)
where 
 = !q   !h and 
T , 	 as dened above. Second order conditions require that

T
 > 0. Furthermore, an interior solution (0 < ' < 1) emerges i¤zt [1  !q)
T   A!q
] =
 <
	 < [2zt
T
 + [(1  !q)
T   A!q
]] =
 (i.e., 0 < 't < 1). A corner solution will
emerge if	  [2zt
T
 + [(1  !q)
T   A!q
]] =
 ('t = 1) or	  zt [(1  !q)
T   A!q
] =

('t = 0).
Lemma 2 presents the comparative statics with respect to technology and policy
parameters.
Lemma 2 Whenever an interior solution emerges, the fraction of public funds
directed to education, 't,
i) is increasing in B and decreasing in A,
ii) decreases (increases) with  if 
T > 0 (
T < 0).
Proof. The above results can be obtained by taking the derivatives of the interior
solution with respect to each parameter.
The intuition of the second result is as follows. If abatement is the more e¤ective
public activity, A!q > B!h, then the politician allocates less revenue to education as the
tax rate increases and vise versa. She does so in order to maximize the e¤ectiveness of
pubic spending and to increase her own income by minimizing citizenstax evasion.18
Overall, politiciansdecision process has many analogies to that of citizens. In
allocating public funds between the two activities, she balances her own consumption and
her o¤springswell being while taking into account citizensreaction.
18Citizens optimally choose to pay higher taxes when they observe that the politician directs a higher
share of the tax revenue to the most productive activity.
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Strategic Interactions
As suggested by the two groupsreaction functions, given in equations (8) and (10),
each groups expectations regarding the other groups choice are an important determinant
of their own decision making process. Therefore strategic interaction emerges, operating
through the common interest for the provision of the public goods, i.e., education and
environmental quality. The sign of both reaction functionsslope depends on the sign of
the term 
T . In particular, we can distinguish two cases.
Lemma 3 A) If 
T < 0 =) A!q < B!h =) @zt@'t > 0;
@'t
@zt
> 0; i.e., the optimal
reactions of politicians and citizens are strategic complements.
A) If 
T > 0 =) A!q > B!h =) @zt@'t < 0;
@'t
@zt
< 0; i.e., the optimal reactions of
politicians and citizens are strategic substitutes.
Proof. Results (A)-(B) can be obtained by taking the derivative of each groups
reaction function, equations (8) and (10), with respect to the other groups decision
variable, which yields,
@zt
@'t
=
 	
T
2 (A!q   't
T )2
? 0 and @
2zt
(@'t)
2 =
 	
2T
2(A!q   't
T )3
< 0; (11)
@'t
@zt
=
 	
2 2zt
T
? 0; and @
2't
(@zt)
2 =
	
2 2z2t
T
? 0: (12)
Case (A) refers to a situation in which public spending on education is more
e¤ective relative to abatement (i.e., A!q < B!h), due to either relatively lower rates of
rent seeking (i.e., !q < !h) and/or due to more e¢ cient technology (i.e., A < B). In
this case, citizens optimally reward the honest attitude of the politicians (where honesty
is perceived as allocating more money to the most e¢ cient activity, i.e. education) by
evading less (i.e., @zt=@'t < 0). In case (B) public spending on abatement is more e¤ective
relative to education (i.e., A!q > B!h), due to either relatively lower rates of rent seeking
(i.e., !q > !h) and/or due to more e¤ective technology (i.e., A > B). In this case
citizensreaction function is decreasing at a decreasing rate while that of politicians, at
an increasing rate. Citizens optimally declare a lower fraction zt of their income to tax
authorities as they observe politicians directing a higher share of public funds to education,
which is the less productive activity.19 Each group optimally reciprocates to the other
19Second order condition of politiciansmaximization problem requires that when 
T < 0, then 
 < 0,
i.e. !q < !h.
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groups cheating behavior and thus, dening both groupsstrategic choices as cheat - not
cheat, they are mutually reinforcing, i.e. they are always strategic complements.
Figure 1 illustrates the two cases of strategic interactions. In order to keep the
graphical illustration aligned with the mathematical notation, we choose to illustrate the
reaction functions in the [zt, 't] space instead of the [cheat, not cheat] space. Figure
1a illustrates citizens(Rc) and politicians(Rp) reaction functions when 
T < 0, that
is, the case of strategic complementarity. In this case, as politicians allocate more funds
to education, which is the more productive activity (A!q < B!h), citizens reciprocate
by declaring higher part of their income (higher 't leads to higher zt). Figure 1b
illustrates both groups reaction functions when 
T > 0, that is, the case of strategic
complementarity. In this case, if politicians choose to invest a higher share of public
funds on education (higher 't), which is the less productive activity (A!q > B!h),
20
thereby signalling a more corrupt behavior, citizens optimally "punish" them by evading
a higher fraction of their income (lower zt). Dening strategic choices as cheat - not
cheat, the strategic decisions of the two groups are again mutually reinforcing (higher
embezzlement on the part of the politicians, leads to higher evasion on the part of the
citizens). This is so despite the fact that both reaction functions are decreasing in the [zt,
't] space, which implies strategic substitutability.
zt
jt
1
1
Rc
Rp
Ens
El
Eh
zt
jt
1
1
Rc
RpEns
Eh
El
(a) if 
T < 0 (b) if 
T > 0
Figure 1. Citizens(Rc) and politicians(Rp) reaction function
20Again, the second order condition of (9) requires that when 
T > 0, then 
 > 0, i.e. !h > !q.
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Figures 1a and 1b illustrate citizens(Rc) and politicians(Rp) reaction functions
within the feasible range of values [0; 1]. Three equilibria may occur denoted by points
Eh; Ens and El: Using best reply dynamics we observe that Eh and El are stable equilibria
whereas Ens is an unstable equilibrium. Figure 1a depicts the case in which 
T < 0 and
!q < !h, that is, education is the more e¢ cient activity and also the one that allows
less rent seeking. Eh denotes the high corruption equilibrium, in which the economy
experiences high tax evasion (small zt) and the total tax revenue is being directed to
abatement ('t = 0) which allows for maximum rent seeking. El denotes the low corruption
equilibrium where citizens declare a large fraction of their income (high zt) and a positive
part of the tax revenue is directed to the less rent seeking activity ('t > 0). Figure 1b
illustrates the case in which abatement is the more e¤ective activity (
T > 0) and the one
that allows less rent seeking (!q > !h). El denotes the low corruption equilibrium where
citizens declare a large fraction of their income (high zt) and all public revenue is directed
to the less rent seeking activity ('t = 0). Eh denotes the high corruption equilibrium, in
which the economy experiences high tax evasion (small zt) and only a small fraction of
the total tax revenue is being directed to abatement (high 't) which allows for high rent
seeking.
3.4 Equilibrium
The above analysis relies on the implicit assumption that an equilibrium exists. The aim
of this section is to establish the conditions under which an equilibrium can be dened.
The literature has examined coordination games in which strategic complemen-
tarity exists (for example, Cooper and John, 1988 and Vives, 2005). Games of strategic
complementarity are those in which the best response of any player is increasing in the
actions of the rival, as is the case for zt and 't when 
T < 0. Strategic complementarity
is a condition for the existence of multiple equilibria in symmetric coordination games.21
The resulting equilibria are not driven by fundamentals. Instead, they are self-fullling
and critically depend on one groups anticipation of the other groups behavior.
However, the game analyzed here is not symmetric. Moreover, the boundedness
property of the choice set necessitates the consideration of corner solutions. In fact, as
we show below, this game does not share many of the properties of games with strategic
complementarity. Consider rst the following denition of equilibrium:
21Notice however that also in games with strategic substitutability multiple equilibria may occur as
well (Randon, 2009).
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Denition 1 A Nash equilibrium in this economy consists of sequences { cit}1t=0;
{zt}1t=0; {'t}
1
t=0; {yct}
1
t=0; {ht}
1
t=0; {Ht}
1
t=0; {Et}
1
t=0; {Qt}
1
t=0; {t}
1
t=0; i = c; p, such
that, given an initial average stock of human capital H 1 > 0 and an average level of
environmental quality Q 1 > 0; in every period t;
1. Private citizens choose zt to maximize their utility, taking 't as given.
2. Politicians choose 't to maximize their utility, taking zt as given.
3. The sequences {ht}1t=0; {yct}
1
t=0; {Qt}
1
t=0; {Et}
1
t=0; {t}
1
t=0 and { cit}
1
t=0; are
determined according to (2), (4), (3), (5), (6), (7), and (9).
4. ht = Ht
Each groups individual optimization problem is well dened since the utility
function is strictly concave and the budget constraint is linear with respect to the relevant
decision variable, zt or 't. Proposition 1 proves the existence of a pair (zt; 't) that satises
Denition 1 in every period. Given the existence of the equilibrium pair (zt; 't); we can
easily establish the equilibrium values of the remaining variables, following Denition 1.
Proposition 1 An equilibrium pair (zt; 't) exists for every t.
Proof. We must establish the existence of a pair (zt; 't) that satises equations
(8) and (10) simultaneously. For an arbitrary time period t, let zt = f('t) denote the
solution to the citizens problem, as described by equation (8); for each value of 't there
exists a unique value of zt: Similarly, let 't = g(zt) denote the solution to each politicians
problem, as described by equation (10). Note that both of these functions are continuous
(see equations (8) and (10)). Thus, the composite function g  f from [0; 1] to [0; 1] is
continuous and, by Browers xed point theorem, has a xed point.
Solving the two groupsreaction functions we obtain the following three equilibrium
values (zi , '

i ), i = 1; 2; 3 that correspond to the ones described in Figure 1 above,
z1 = zt('t = 0) '

1 = 't(zt = 0)
z2 =
p
 p 8
	
4
p

'2 =
 (1 !q)
T+3A!q
 
p
( 8
	)
4
T

z3 =
p
+
p
 8
	
4
p

or corner (z3 = 1) '

3 =
 (1 !q)
T+3A!q
+
p
( 8
	)
4
T

or corner (3 = 0)
where  = !h!q (A B)   
T . For the non-zero equilibrium values of z and ' to be
real numbers, it is necessary that   0, and    8
	  0. The rst condition implies
that B
A
> (1 !h)=!h
(1 !q)=!q , i.e. the ratio of technological e¢ ciency of education to abatement
should exceed the ratio of the rates of embezzlement. This condition leads to the following
Lemma that restricts attention to the case of strategic complementarity.
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Lemma 4 A) Only the case of strategic complementarity yields real equilibrium
solutions.
B) In the case of strategic complementarity, i.e., 
T < 0, the technology of either activity
could be better, i.e., A ? B:
Proof. Result (A) can be obtained by considering the rst condition for real
equilibrium solutions, i.e.  = !h!q (A B) 
T > 0: Assume strategic substitutability
i.e. 
T > 0. Then for  > 0 it must necessarily be that A > B. However,  > 0 )
B!h (1  !q) > A!q (1  !h). Recall that, from second order conditions, when 
T > 0,
it is necessary that 
 > 0) !q > !h. Thus, for  > 0 it is necessary that B > A, which
contradicts the previous assumption. Therefore, to obtain real solutions we must restrict
the analysis to the case of strategic complementarity, i.e., 
T < 0:
Result (B) follows again from the restriction that  > 0: In the case of strategic comple-
mentarity, i.e., 
T < 0; this inequality can be satised for A ? B; as long as BA >
(1 !h)=!h
(1 !q)=!q .
3.5 E¤ectiveness of Environmental Policy
After establishing the existence of equilibrium and restricting our attention to strategic
complementarity we examine the e¤ect of environmental policy on environmental quality.
For strategic complementarity 
T < 0 and 
 < 0 ) !q < !h, which implies that
abatement is the more prone to rent seeking activity. Abatement could be either more
or less technologically advanced relative to education, A ? B depending on the !s
di¤erence. Under these conditions, does shifting more public funds towards abatement
improves environmental quality?
Interestingly, the e¤ect of 't on environmental quality is not obvious. A precocious
presumption, resulting from direct observation of equations (3) and (6), is that an increase
in the share of public funds directed towards abatement activities has always a positive
e¤ect on environmental quality. However, this is not always true, since the e¤ectiveness
of publicly funded abatement depends on both the levels of rent seeking and tax evasion
and on technological e¢ ciency. Proposition 2 provides an answer to the above stated
question.
Proposition 2 Increasing the share of public spending on abatement activities, does
not necessarily improve environmental quality. The e¤ect depends on both the relative
technological e¢ ciency and the rent seeking opportunities.
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Proof. From equations (3) and (6) we get, @Qt
@(1 't) =  
@Qt
@'t
=  
h
 !qzt + (1  't) @zt@'t
i
ht.
Since, by Lemma 4, we restrict our attention to strategic complementarity, we have
@zt
@'t
> 0. Thus,
@Qt
@(1  't)
7 0 if (1  't)
@zt
@'t
? !qzt: (13)
The above inequality could hold either way, depending on the parameter values. There-
fore, for a range of parameter values, (1  't) @zt@'t > !qzt ) @Qt=@(1   't) < 0, which
implies that increasing public spending on abatement actually decreases environmental
quality. Recall that abatement is the high rent seeking activity (!q < !h).
Proposition 2 formally proves that increasing the share of public revenue allocated
to the less e¤ective public activity can potentially be detrimental. This result holds
for economies with relatively loose enforcement mechanisms, in which reciprocity of
corrupt behavior between citizens and politicians is a key determinant of raising tax
revenue. Anecdotal evidence cited in Section 2, accords with our ndings suggesting that
a large number of corrupt economies cannot increase their environmental quality even
after increasing the funds allocated to environmental protection. Shifting public revenues
towards such activities, despite of the great potential they present, it might prove not
only ine¤ective but also detrimental if 
T < 0 and condition (13) holds.
Policy implications
In terms of policy, our results suggest that an intervention towards decreasing the
rate of embezzlement of the public money allocated in environmental policy, is crucial
for improving environmental quality. In economies that are highly susceptible to cor-
ruption, successful anti-corruption campaigns could play a crucial role in improving the
e¤ectiveness of investment in technologically advanced environmental projects.
Although we have treated the rates of embezzlement 1 !h and 1 !q as exogenous,
institutional changes, aiming at reducing rent seeking opportunities associated with each
type of public activity, could substantially increase !h and !q. As far as tax policy is
concerned, the lower is the tax rate the smaller is tax evasion. The condition  < 1
2
is
necessary (but not su¢ cient) for a nil-evasion (zt = 1) equilibrium to be feasible. There-
fore, not very high tax rates coupled with low rent seeking opportunities can improve the
models outcome. Overall, a society has to ensure the well functioning of the public sector
by strengthening its institutions in order to improve the e¤ectiveness of environmental
policy.
In order to obtain analytical results several restrictive assumptions have been
employed in the baseline analysis. However, our results are robust to adopting more
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realistic assumptions. The appendix illustrates a more elaborate model where di¤erent
assumptions are tested. Whereas we cannot derive analytical results, numerical simula-
tions conrm our ndings.
4 Conclusions
We develop a model that allow us to establish an additional channel via which corruption
a¤ects the environmental quality. In particular, we suggest that, in the presence of
corruption, environmental projects do not necessarily yield the expected improvements
in environmental quality, given the amount of public funds allocated to them and could
actually have detrimental e¤ects on environmental quality. In a model where politicians
decide about policies and citizens pay taxes, this e¤ect is reinforced in two ways: i) the
allocation of public funds to environmental projects may facilitate the extraction of rents
(on the part of the politicians), particularly when the technologies involved are advanced
and thus the investment process less transparent; and ii) the citizens who observe the
poor outcome of public investment choose to increase their tax evasion, thus leading to a
vicious circle of extensive tax evasion, rent seeking and eventually to low environmental
quality.
In light of increasing environmental awareness that pushes for higher spending
on environmental projects and considering the recent scandals suggesting that public
environmental projects can be a rather "protable" domain for corrupt politicians, our
analysis provides interesting policy suggestions. In order to achieve substantial improve-
ments in environmental quality, a society has to strengthen its institutions, targeting to
the reduction of rent seeking opportunities and to the improvement of transparency.
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Appendix 1
A A More Elaborate Model
A.1 The Structure of the Economy
The basic structure of the model is identical to the benchmark model. In short, individuals
live for two periods i.e. childhood and adulthood. During the rst period of their lives
individuals acquire human capital via public schooling whereas in the second period of
their lives they either enter the private market or they become politicians via a random
selection process. Their preferences are dened over their own consumption as well as the
well being of their o¤springs, which is reected by the level of human capital they acquire
as well as by the quality of environment their receive from their parents.
Accumulation of Human Capital
The learning technology in the public education system is quite similar as in the
benchmark model and given by,
ht = V +BEt 1 : (1)
where t denotes time, ht the level of human capital acquired by an individual born
at t 1, Et 1 the public spending on education in the same period whereas the parameter
B > 0 measures the e¢ ciency of the public education system. According to this human
capital accumulation process, a young agent born in period t   1, can acquire, without
e¤ort, a minimum level of human capital V of the previous periods accumulated human
capital. Contrary to the baseline model, we will assume that the fraction of human capital
to be freely obtained does not depend on the human capital of the period t   1:1 As in
the benchmark model the revenue for nancing public schooling comes from taxing the
economic activity of agents.
Production
1This assumption, coupled with the assumptions of the baseline model, allows us to cover a wide
range of equations of motion for human capital and ensure the robustness of our results to alternative
specications.
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Production uses both human capital and the environment/natural resources as
inputs.2 That is, we assume that output yct is,3
yt =  htQt; (2)
where   is the production technology. Evidently at the aggregate level there are increasing
returns to scale. This is a simplifying assumption that allows us to make the model slightly
more tractable.
Environmental Quality
The evolution of environmental quality is described by
Qt = Qt 1     Ht 1Qt 1 + At 1 (3)
where Qt 1 denotes the state of the environment in the previous period and  the
extent of environmental degradation due to previous periods aggregate economic ac-
tivity  Ht 1Qt 1:4 The term At 1 captures the benecial e¤ect of public spending on
abatement on environmental quality, where A is a technological parameter associated with
abatement. We assume that 1    Ht 1 > 0. This formulation is rather common in the
literature.5
Tax Revenue
Both types of individuals maximize their utility function as described by equation
(1) in the basic model. The citizen chooses the fraction z of his income to declare to
the tax authority and the politician the fraction ' of the total tax revenue to allocate to
environmental projects.
The total tax revenue collected in period t is Rt = zt htQt. As in the previous
model a fraction tzt BhtQt of the total tax revenue is earmarked for public education.
Since the politician peculates a fraction 1  !h of tRt and 1  !q of (1  t)Rt, of the
actual amounts spent on education Et and abatement t are,
Et = 't!hzt htQt; (4)
2We enrich the production function in order to extend our results to the natural resource strand of
the literature and to highlight the robustness of our results to a more elaborate production structure.
See for example Gennaioli and Tavoni (2011) for the link between renewable resources and corruption.
3Since all agents have the same level of human capital and the natural resource is commonly owned,
we omit the subscript i = c; p from both variables.
4This is an additional robustness control to the equation of motion for the environment, in which case
in the absence of any economic activity the initial environmental quality Q0 would be positive.
5See for example Economides and Philippopoulos (2008), and John and Pecchenino (1994).
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t = (1  't)!qzt htQt; (5)
respectively. Individual optimization decisions regarding zt and 't a¤ect the sum and
the allocation of public spending between education and abatement and consequently the
human capital and the state of the environment enjoyed by the next generation.
A.2 Individual Optimization
Citizen
Citizens declare a fraction zt of their income yt to the tax authority. Hence, citizens
disposable income is (1   )zt htQt + (1   zt) htQt = (1   zt) htQt: The individual
optimization problem solved by each citizen born in period t  1 is,
max
cct;zt
cct[ht+1;+Qt+1] (6)
subject to
cct = (1  zt) htQt ; (7)
cct  0; 1  zt  0 ;
where h, Q, E and  are determined by equations equations (1), (3) (4) and (5), taking
't, Ht and Qt as given.
The rst order condition of the above problem yields citizens best response func-
tion,
zt = f('t) =
(A!q   't
T )  HtQt  	n
2 HtQt (A!q   't
T )
; (8)
where 
T = A!q B!h and 	n = Qt+V    HtQt. Concavity holds since B!h 't
T >
0.
Citizens reaction function in (8) has similar characteristics as the one in the
benchmark model (equation (8)).6 However, in this case the reaction function is path
dependent, since zt depends on the the level of economic activity, yt, that is, on Ht
and Qt. These variables evolve over time until the economy approaches a steady state
(whenever a steady state exists) and therefore the optimal strategy is changing over time.
6The slope of the citizens reaction function is, @zt=@'t =  	n
T =22HtQt(A!q   '
T )2 and
@2zt= (@'t)
2
=  	n
2T =22HtQt(A!q '
T )3 < 0 since A!q '
T > 0. Therefore, as in the benchmark
model, the sign of citizen reaction functions slope depends on the sign of the term 
T .
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It is important to note that at time t the values ofHt andQt have been already determined
by the previous generation and therefore each generation treats them as exogenous.
Inspection of equation (8) reveals that an interior solution (0 < z < 1) exists i¤
(2   1) HtQt (A!q   't
T ) < 	n <  HtQt (A!q   't
T ). A corner solution zt = 1
will emerge if the rate of human capital transferred freely to the next generation, V , is
su¢ ciently high (low), the rate of degradation of environmental quality,  ; su¢ ciently
low (high) and the rent reeking rates, (1 !h) and (1 !q); su¢ ciently high (low). As in
the benchmark model, for su¢ ciently high  ( > 1
2
), the tax evasion rate is never zero,
since z < 1.
Whenever an interior solution emerges, the comparative statics with respect to
technology and policy parameters are given in Lemma A.1.
Lemma A.1Whenever an interior solution emerges, the tax evasion rate ( 1  zt)
is reduced,
i) the more e¢ cient is the use of tax revenues, (i.e. the higher are A and B),
ii) the lower are the rent seeking rates (i.e., !q and !h), and
iii) the lower is the tax rate,  .
Proof. Results (i)-(iii) can be obtained by taking the derivatives of the interior
solution with respect to each parameter.
Politician
The politicians income is derived solely from peculation of tax revenue and is
['t(1  !q) + (1  t)(1  !h)]zt htQt. The politicians optimization problem is,
max
cpt;t
cpt[ht+1;+Qt+1] (9)
subject to
cpt = [(1  't)(1  !q) + t(1  !h)]zt htQt ; (10)
cpt  0; 1  't  0 ;
where h, Q, E and  are determined by equations equations (1), (3) (4) and (5), taking
't, Ht and Qt as given.
Maximization of the politicians best response function yields,
't = g(zt) =

	n  Xzt HtQt
2
T
zt HtQt
=   X
2
T

+
	
2
T zt HtQt
; (11)
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where 
 = !q   !h and X = (1  !q) 
T   A!q
.7
For interior solutions (0 < ' < 1) it is required that ztX HtQt=
 < 	n <
zt HtQt(2
T
 + X)=
. On the other hand, corner solutions of directing revenue to a
unique policy ('t = 0 and 't = 1; respectively) emerge depending on the values of !h;
!q.
Lemma A.2 Whenever an interior solution emerges, the fraction of public funds
directed to education, 't,
i) is increasing in B, and decreasing in A,
iii) the e¤ect of  ;  and Q0 and V depends on the sign of 
T . Specically
A!q  B!h ? 0 =) @'t
@
7 0; @'t
@ 
7 0; @'t
@Q0
? 0and@'t
@V
? 0:
Overall we observe that despite the fact that our setting is more complex and
realistic, the predictions of the model are quite similar with respect to the reaction
functions. As was the case with the citizens reaction function, the politicians reaction
function also depends on the realized values of Ht and Qt which are predetermined by the
previous generation and therefore each generation of politicians treats them as exogenous.
Strategic Interactions
Strategic interactions in this setting are similar to the benchmark case. As we
show above, the sign of both reaction functionsslope depends on the sign of the term

T . Analytically,
i) 
T < 0 =) A!q < !h =) @zt@'t > 0;
@'t
@zt
> 0 i.e. Strategic Complements
ii) 
T > 0 =) A!q > !h =) @zt@'t < 0;
@'t
@zt
< 0 i.e. Strategic Substitutes
yielding similar predictions to the benchmark model. Namely, in the case of strategic
complements citizens will choose to "punish" politicians in case they perceive their be-
havior as corrupt, whereas in the case of strategic substitutes they behave more honestly
in order to keep public revenues high.
7Similar to the benchmark model, for concavity to hold we must have 
T
 > 0. The
slope of the politicians reaction function is, @'t=@zt =  	n=2z2t 2 HtQt
T , with @2't= (@zt)2 =
	n=4 z
3
t 2HtQt
T . The sign of reaction functionsslope depends on the sign of the term 
T .
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A.3 Equilibrium
The denition of equilibrium remains the same in both models. Each groups individual
optimization problem is well dened since its utility function is strictly concave and
the budget constraint linear with respect to the relevant decision variable, zt or 't: In
Proposition A.1 below, we prove the existence of a pair (zt; 't) that satises Denition 1
in every period, for given values of Ht and Qt. Given the existence of the equilibrium pair
(zt; 't); we can easily establish the equilibrium values of Ht and Qt and subsequently of
the remaining variables, following Denition 1 in the main body of the paper.
Proposition A.1 An equilibrium pair (zt; 't) exists for given values of Ht and
Qt:
Proof. We must establish the existence of a pair (zt; 't) that satises equations
(8) and (11) simultaneously. For an arbitrary time period t, let zt = f('t; ht; Qt) denote
the solution to each citizens problem, as described by equation (8); for each value of 't
there exists a unique value of zt: Similarly, let 't = g(zt; ht; Qt) denote the solution to each
politicians problem, as described by equation (11). Note that both of these functions are
continuous (see equations (8) and (11)). Thus, the composite function g  f : [0; 1] !
[0; 1] is continuous and, by Browers xed point theorem, has a xed point.
Solving for the equilibrium values of the model we obtain,8
z1 = f
1(h1; Q

1) or corner (z

1 = 0)
z2 = f
2(h2; Q

2)
z3 = f
3(h3; Q

3) or corner (z

3 = 1)
'1 = g
1(h1; Q

1) or corner (

1 = 0)
'2 = g
2(h2; Q

2)
'3 = g
3(h3; Q

3) or corner (

3 = 0)
(12)
Therefore in terms of strategies there always exists an equilibrium for given values
of ht and Qt: Since however there is a law of motion describing how these two variables
evolve, there will be di¤erent equilibrium values in each period for zt and 't unless the
system approaches a steady state. The dynamics of the model are analyzed in the following
subsection.
A.4 Dynamic Behavior of the System of Di¤erence Equations
As noted above the stable solutions of the model (if all three are valid) are (z1 ; '

1) and
(z3 ; '

3) using best reply dynamics. Since the set (z

1 ; '

1) represents a trivial equilibrium
8We omit analytical expression due to their complexity.
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of high levels of corruption we will focus on the low-corruption equilibrium (z3 ; '

3).
Replacing the equilibrium values for (z3 ; '

3) from equation (12) into equations (1) and
(3) we obtain the following system of two autonomous non-linear rst order di¤erence
equations
ht+1 = F (ht; Qt) ;
Qt+1 = G(ht; Qt) :
The dynamics of the system are too complex to be analytically studied. However, we can
describe analytically the kind of solution that is desirable in order for our model to be
meaningful and provide numerical simulations.
In order to approximate the dynamics of our benchmark model, i.e. a set of
equilibrium values for (zt; 't) that remain unchanged in every period, our system of
di¤erence equations must reach a steady state. Therefore we rst assume that the dynamic
system has steady-state equilibrium (h; Q). Namely, 9 (h; Q) such that,
h = F (h; Q) ;
Q = G(h; Q) :
A Taylor expansion of the system around the steady state values (h; Q), yields:
ht+1 = F (ht; Qt) (13)
= F (h) + Fh(h; Q)(ht   h) + FQ(h; Q)(Qt   Q) +R1 +R2 ;
Qt+1 = G(ht; Qt) (14)
= G( Q) +Gh(h; Q)(ht   h) +GQ(h; Q)(Qt   Q) +R1 +R2 ;
where Fh(h; Q) and Gh(h; Q) are the partial derivatives of the functions F (ht; Qt) and
G(ht; Qt) evaluated at (h; Q) and R1 and R2 are the error terms which are very small in
the neighborhood of (h; Q) and have little inuence on the behavior of the system. Thus,
the non-linear system is being approximated, locally (around the steady-state equilibrium)
by the linear system:"
ht+1
Qt+1
#
=
"
F (h)
G( Q)
#
+
"
Fh(h; Q) FQ(h; Q)
Gh(h; Q) GQ(h; Q)
#"
ht   h
Qt   Q
#
;
29
where,
J(h; Q) =
"
Fh(h; Q) FQ(h; Q)
Gh(h; Q) GQ(h; Q)
#
; (15)
is the Jacobian matrix evaluated at the steady-state equilibrium. Qo and h0 denote the
initial values for ht and Qt and are exogenously given.
If all eigenvalues of J(h; Q) have moduli strictly less than 1, (h; Q) is asymptotically
stable (a sink). If at least one eigenvalue of J(h; Q) has modulus greater than 1, then (h; Q)
is unstable (a source). If the eigenvalues of J(h; Q) are all inside the unit circle, but at least
one is on the boundary (has modulus 1), then (h; Q) may be stable, asymptotically stable
or unstable. Therefore we take the following steps: Test whether our system approaches
the steady state (h; Q). For this steady state to be a feasible solution, the dynamics of the
system must satisfy the limitations of the model, namely concavity and the implied values
z  1 and '  1. Also the dynamics of the system must be characterized by stability, i.e.
the eigenvalues must be inside the unit circle.
If the above restrictions hold, then we are fully able to describe the behavior of the
equilibrium values of (z; ') in every period of the model up to the steady state. It is
important to have a stable steady state since otherwise ht and Qt grow without limits, and
taking into account that @z

@ht
> 0 and @z

@Qt
> 0, the value of zt will increase continuously
reaching eventually unity.
B Numerical Approximations
The enriched model closely follows the benchmark model up to the point were we obtain
the reaction functions. However due to the system of non-linear di¤erence equations it
quickly becomes rather complicated. Therefore we resort to numerical simulations in
order to illustrate our results.
The model uses a number of parameters, namely A;B;  ,  , !h; !q; V; and  : As
the above analysis reveals, the most important term driving our results is 
T = A!q !h,
determining the type of strategic interaction between the two groups of agents.
Evidently the model is a rough approximation of reality therefore it is hard to
clarify what values of the parameters can be considered as "realistic". Still though with
respect to tax evasion there is some evidence that in the Western developed countries the
rates of tax evasion are estimated around 5%-25% of potential tax revenue (Feige, 1989,
Pyle, 1989, Thomas, 1992) while for developing countries higher rates may appear (Tanzi
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and Shome, 1994). For the year 1988 in the US, the TCMP has estimated that only a
53% of tax payers paid their taxes correctly. Of course non compliance does not apply to
all these cases, since a 7% has overpaid its taxes while a part of the remaining 40% has
underpaid due to errors that result from the complicated procedure involved. According
to Fanzoni (1998) the federal income tax gap of the US had been estimated for 1998 at
17%.
Concerning the values of !h and !q there is much evidence that di¤erent allocations
of public budget are associated with di¤erent rent-seeking rates. Mauro (1998) nds
evidence that public expenditure on high-technology goods is associated with higher rent-
seeking due to low detectability and the same goes for military expenditure. On the
other hand education and health sectors involve more transparent expenditure and are
thus associated with lower rent-seeking rates. The range of these rates varies enormously
depending on the quality of institutions in each country. The rates of embezzlement
could be as low as 0.5%-2% for developed countries and could be as high as 30%-50%
for developing countries. Since our model primarily targets to account for abatement in
highly corrupt countries we will allow for high embezzlement rates (i.e., !h and !q; can
be as low as 0.5-0.6). Tax rates vary between 0.25-0.55.
As to the parameters A; B; and   it is harder to pin down which range of values
would be plausible. Therefore we will focus on their between ratio as implied by our
model, namely A; B and   > 0 and A!q < B!h for strategic complementarity which is
the case we analyze. For the value of v there is also no evidence, still though it is plausible
to assume that it will take rather small values, well below unity (e.g. Ceroni (2001) takes
values of v as low as v = 0:2).
Having pinned down the range of parameter values and having imposed the restric-
tions mentioned earlier, namely concavity, strategic complementarity and an asymptoti-
cally stable steady state we obtain a number of feasible steady states. Figure 1 illustrates
a numerical example with specic values of the models parameters.
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Figure A.1: Numerical Reaction Functions-The parameter values are A = 5; B = 9; !h = 0:6;
!q = 0:5;  = 0:3; v = 0:2;  = 0:4;   = 4; Q0 = 0:11 and H0 = 0:28:
In this example, in line with the predictions of our baseline model, there are two
stable and one unstable (z2 ; 

2) = (0:734; 0:430) equilibria emerging. The two stable
equilibria are the high (z1 ; 

1) = (0:268; 0) and the low (z

3 ; 

3) = (0:931; 0:776) corruption
equilibria: In the high corruption equilibrium (z1 ; 

1) the politician allocates the entire
tax revenue to the corrupt activity, i.e., abatement and the citizen declares a small potion
of his income. In the low corruption equilibrium she allocates a high portion of public
fund to education and the citizen reciprocates by declaring almost all his income.
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